Sunday, August 31, 2008

Russia's farming: testing different kinds of social performance models. Agriculture reform


A recent article on the New York Times illustrates the challenges post-Soviet Russia is facing in the transition to from collective agriculture to sustainable, entrepreneurial farming.
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Almost two decades after the collapse of the communist system, most of Russia's large agricultural land -35 million hectars (the world's largest) is still operated under a underperforming ecosystem of Soviet-era collective, State-owned farms.
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The raising value of grains has attracted the interest of Russian venture capital, looking to continue their success with oil.
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The main challenge for the new private farms is twofold: organizing production in a sustainable scale -following the model of Argentina, Australia and New Zealand- that allows the required investment in modern technology and organizational methods and changing the Soviet-era culture of low work ethics creating new incentives for farmers.
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Agricultural yields in Russia are very low -1.85 tons per hectare against 3.04 in Canada and 6.36 tons in the United States- but prices of both land and its products are at historically high levels.
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During the Soviet era, agriculture's performance was abysmally low, provoking millions of deaths in famines during the 30s and 40s and forcing recurrent food rationing crises that became a symbol of the failure of soviet collectivization to feed the country. In order to calm the popular unrest created for food shortages and famines, Lenin himself authorized diverse forms of private farming -such as Lenin's New Economic Policy of 1920 -that prevented famines but still kept overall production low and unrealiable. Stalin took the opposite road (collectivization) as part of his "War Communism" policies during the 1928 agriculture crisis-creating through price controls and centralization a dysfunctional system.
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The most daunting challenge for 2008's Russia is modifying 70 years of culture of state owned bureaucracy and neglect that provoked a massive exode of qualified young labor to the cities, rendering the farmland idle or underexploited.
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Other critical challenge is the possibility that Wladimir Putin's administration takes over the old collective farms and keeps them as a state-owned monopoly under a nationalist-fascist model that seems to characterize its approach to economics, veering from the more entrepreneurial policies of previous governments like Boris Yeltsin's.
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This brings about an interesting case of what economists Baumol and Schram characterized as the clash between functional, entrepreneurial capitalism and other dysfunctional forms such as monopoly capitalism and state-owned capitalism.
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  • What would you suggest to address the challenge of motivating agricultural workers toward higher productivity and entrepreneurship?
  • How could this situation compare to Mexico's and Sonora's agriculture challenges?
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Related reading
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Wednesday, August 20, 2008

BOP business models: the dabbawala's distribution chain

The case of the dabbawalla's food distribution system has been commented recently for The Economist and analyzed in a Harvard Business Review case study. This bottom-of-pyramid (BOP) business model appeared as an "emerging strategy" (Mintzberg, 1985) in 1890, originally created by a single person, who was hired to carry and deliver home-made meals to a prosperous banker in Mumbay (Bombay).

Thanks to business-to-business and word-of-mouth referrals, the dabbawala delivery system grew rapidly, reaching 175,000 customers and employing 5,142 dabbawalas in 2003. It is currently expanding with modifications to other Indian cities such as Pune, Chennai, Delhi and Hyderabad.

The "value creation engine" of the dabbawala business model is a highly organized distribution chain, managed by 5 to 8-people strong teams coordinated by only two levels of management: team leaders or mukadams and an executive committee that deals with the railroads and clients.

Each day, the dabbawalas provide 350,000 home-cooked meals to their customers in Mumbai, from their homes to their workplaces at a price of about 10 dollars a month and with a Six-Sigma level of accuracy.

The dabbawala workforce has very low formal education -grammar school-, an average age of 55 years and makes an entry salary of 2,000 rupees and a regular salary of 5,000 rupees -both well above poverty level in India- enjoying employment for life and self-sustained retirement.

Based on cultural bonds and very simple, low technology -which is now including cell phones to SMS the dababwala- such as bycicles, tin lunch boxes (called dabbas) and crates to carry the dabbas in the train.

How could the dabbawala business model principles and lessons be applied to our PII/IMD projects?

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References

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Beyond "low price" value propositions: Lessons from India

As a consequence of a combination of factors -US economy slowdown, rising salaries and new low-cost competition-, India's tech outsourcing industry is experiencing a significant growth slowdown, according to a recent Wall Street Journal research article.

Outsourcing industry leaders such as Infosys, TCS and Wipro have reduce annual growth from 30% in average for 2005-2007 to low single digits for 2008-2009.

India's leadership in the global technology outsourcing market -a 30 billion dollar a year industry- is still strong, but some of its weaknesses are showing up.

The original, generic low-cost strategy that propelled India's IT to the global forefront after a successful start in 1999 in helping US companies to prevent the Millenium Bug crisis is no longer effective.

With an increasingly better-paid workforce -which increased its real salaries in a 15% annual average- and a slowing economy in the major client -US-, India faces new competition from other Asian nations that followed its model and have comparatively cheaper costs.

The true challenge for Indian firms is to get to the next level, using strategies based on competitive rather than comparative advantages, and focusing in services beyond cost-reduction outsourcing.

A lesson to be considered for our IT projects, and an opportunity for Mexico's near-shoring alternatives.

What could we do to benefit from it?

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References

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Sunday, August 3, 2008

On Money & Tools

Roger Kaufman sent a delightful set of "I believe" statements to me. I selected one to comment on:

I Believe...

That money is a lousy way of keeping score.

I Believe...

That money is a lousy way of keeping score; but all other ways are worse.

It is like democracy, flawed but better than any of the alternatives..

I Believe

Any tool, used badly, yields bad results

I Believe

Any tool, used blindly, yields bad results more often than not.

I Believe

Mega-Planning, done intelligently, helps us use other tools intelligently.

I Believe

A few tools, used well, get better results than many tools used as well as possible.

I Believe

That money, used for a purpose other than facilitating non-coerced value exchanges, leads to bad results.